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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
) 
) 
Appel lee, ) 
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE 
In this second appeal Price Waterhouse asks this Court 
(1) to reverse as clearly erroneous the District Court's findings 
of fact as to liability made on the same record that was 
previously before this Court and the Supreme Court, and (2) to 
vacate as an abuse of discretion the relief which this Court 
foresaw as an appropriate option in the first appeal and which is 
squarely in line with the principles since laid down by the court 
in Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153 (D.C.Cir. 1989) . ..!/ 
These are not difficult questions which fuller briefing 
might illuminate. Appellate courts reverse on grounds of clear 
error or abuse of discretion only rarely, and the record in this 
case provides no basis for doing so here. It is time to put this 
case to rest. 
y Price Waterhouse's contention that this Court's prior decision on relief issues is not the law of the case because it was hinged to a liability decision which the Supreme Court later vacated finds no support even in Judge Williams' 1986 dissent. See 825 F.2d at 473, note 1. The facts concerning the refusal to repropose Ms. Hopkins for partnership were part of the record before this Court in that first appeal. See 825 F.2d at 463; 618 F.Supp. at 1114-1115; Remand Oecision at 23-24. 
1. The factual record concerning liability is precisely the 
same as it was in 1985. Price Waterhouse presented no new 
evidence on remand to support a finding in its favor under the 
"less exacting standard" (Remand Decision at 2) mandated by the 
Supreme Court. Instead it relied on "advocacy, not proof." Id. 
at 7. However, "Price Waterhouse had the burden to prove 
something; it had to persuade the [District) Court. This it has 
failed to do." Id. at 8. Price Waterhouse asks this Court to 
hold that as a matter of law, the court below ought to have been 
persuaded, by advocacy, not proof, to change its mind. 
The unstated premise of Price Waterhouse's position is that, 
while the Supreme Court itself declined to reassess the evidence, 
it must have intended that this Court should do so if Price 
Waterhouse offered no new proof following remand but the trial 
court again found for Ann Hopkins. That argument is so extreme 
and contrary to the teachings of the Court's decisions on the 
standard of review under F.R.Civ.P. 52(a), e.g., Anderson v. City 
of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 
456 U.S. 273 (1982), that it deserves summary rejection. It is, 
in a word, frivolous. 
2. If that is too strong a term to describe the challenge 
Price Waterhouse makes to the relief ordered by the District 
court, then "insubstantial" is not. The District Court's 
conclusion that it had "ample authority to order partnership in 
the circumstances presented" (Remand Decision at 16) is squarely 
based on Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) and on 
this Court's decision in Lander v. Lujan. Moreover, this Court 
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clearly foresaw the possibility and acknowledged the propriety of 
such relief in its 1986 decision remanding the case to the court 
below for purposes of relief. See Motion for Summary Affirmance, 
page 15, note 7 and accompanying text. 
Therefore, to prevail on this point Price Waterhouse would 
have to show that the District Court abused its discretion in 
failing to find that there was a "significant factor" which made 
such a foreseen "appropriate remedy" either "inequitable or 
otherwise inappropriate" in this particular case. Remand 
Decision at 17. Here, too, it asks this Court to overrule the 
trial court in a matter which is altogether fact-bound and is 
traditionally the province of that court. It bases this 
extraordinary request on the offense which Ms. Hopkins was found 
to have given to a single partner (out of nearly 700) in Price 
Waterhouse and which led that partner to help block her 
renomination in 1984. That, of course, occurred after she should 
have become a partner, at a time when Mr. Epelbaum's changed 
feelings about her would have been of no judicial concern. Y 
See Opposition to Motion for Summary Affirmance pages 18-19, 
citing Remand Decision at 23-25. What Price Waterhouse asks this 
Court to do is rewrite history and fashion relief on the premise 
that it won rather than lost the case on the merits. The court 
below, however, rejected this contention "that a subsequent 
nondiscriminatory action can relieve a Title VII defendant of 
y Mr. Epelbaum was one of two Washington office Price Waterhouse partners whose opposition prevented plaintiff's renomination for partnership in 1984. 618 F.Supp. at 1114-1115; Remand Decision at 23-24. 
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liability for an earlier discriminatory action." Remand Decision 
at 25. 
The fullest briefing and most compelling oral advocacy could 
not give this strained request plausibility. Price Waterhouse 
seeks the most extreme type of appellate intervention in a matter 
that is indisputably entrusted to the trial court's informed 
discretion. It would deny a successful Title VII plaintiff the 
one "appropriate" form of relief that, the court below 
determined, could make her whole, or nearly so. 
Moreover, the very facts which Price Waterhouse argues show 
an abuse of discretion were carefully considered by the District 
Court. The care and concern which an experienced, respected 
district judge gave to the relief issues in this case are 
manifest in his 22 pages of findings and conclusions addressed to 
them. Price Waterhouse presents no substantial reasons why this 
Court should now substitute its own assessment for the judgment 
reached by the court below after such careful deliberation. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues on remand were narrow, and no sound argument can 
be made that the district court either committed clear error on 
-4-
liability or abused its discretion on relief. The decision 
should be summarily affirmed. 
Dougl B. Huron 
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